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Abstract 
 
We depart from the fact that in Europe, unlike the leverage ratio, risk-based capital ratios are 
formally under capital regulation with specified minimum thresholds to be respected. 
Building on this difference, we study their comparative persistence and convergence. For this 
purpose, we borrow the graphical analysis of Lemmon et al. (2008) and use the empirical 
partial adjustment model. Overall, consistent with the findings from the corporate finance 
literature, we find that bank capital structure is quite stable over long periods of time: banks 
that have high (low) capital ratios tend to remain as such for over eight years. Nevertheless, 
we find that even though all future capital ratios are influenced by initial capital ratios, this 
influence seems comparatively more relevant for the non risk-based (or leverage) capital ratio 
highlighting its high persistent phenomenon. Our findings also point to the role played by 
market participants in the trend and the relative rapid convergence of the risk-adjusted capital 
ratios compare to the simple leverage ratio. Our results are thus broadly supportive of recent 
policy initiatives that aim to strengthen the bank capital regulation by introducing a minimum 
leverage ratio and by simultaneously improving market discipline. 
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I. Introduction  
 
In a recent paper, Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) (LRZ for short thereafter) 
study the persistence and the cross-section of capital structure in corporate firms. They mainly 
show that corporate leverage ratios exhibit a significant amount of convergence over time; 
firms with relatively high (low) leverage tend to move toward more moderate levels of 
leverage. However, they also show that despite this convergence, leverage ratios are 
remarkably stable over time; firms with relatively high (low) leverage tend to maintain 
relatively high (low) leverage for over twenty years. Therefore, leverage ratios are 
characterized by both a transitory and a permanent component. They also found that the 
majority of variation in corporate capital structure is time-invariant and that much of this 
variation is unaccounted for by existing empirical specifications. Hence, the main implication 
of their results is the fact that the static pooled OLS regressions are inadequate and they 
pleaded for a model that takes into account those individual fixed effects. The first aim of our 
paper is thus to investigate the extent to which these observations from non financial firms 
apply to banks. Even though to our knowledge this paper is the first to analyse this issue in 
the banking case, the approach of taking insights from corporate literature or comparing 
financial with non financial firms is not new. We can trace back this approach to Miller 
(1995) when he investigated if the Modigliani-Miller propositions apply to banks. Morgan 
(2002), Flannery et al. (2004) and Haggard and Howe (2007) meanwhile study the relative 
opacity of banks compare to non financial firms.  
The closest paper to ours is Gropp and Heider (2010) (GH thereafter) who study to 
what extent corporate capital structure determinants explain bank capital structure using the 
large publicly traded banks in US and Europe2. They established important similarities 
between banks’ and nonfinancial firms’ capital structure and hence conclude on the second 
order importance that capital regulation plays in determining the bank capital structure. This 
comparative approach adopted in GH’s paper in order to investigate the role played by the 
capital regulation (Basel accords) in the bank capital structure is informative and yet suffers 
from a key drawback in our view. Although they refer to the tier1 capital ratio in the sixth 
section (table XII), they mainly focus on the banking leverage whereas in Europe there is no 
formal capital regulation applied to this ratio (as opposed to the US case where the PCA sets 
                                                 
2 An earlier paper by Barber and Lyon (1997) is close in spirit to GH’s paper by investigating if the significant 
relationship between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns documented by Fama and French 
(1992) for non financial firms exists for financial firms.   
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formal limits to the leverage). Therefore, the second aim of our paper seeks to fill this gap by 
systematically comparing the bank leverage with risk-adjusted capital ratios to uncover their 
differences and hence infer the role of capital regulation if any3. This investigation is 
interesting because, beyond re-instating the role played by the minimum regulatory capital, 
our results could help us to conjecture the potential trend of the leverage ratio once it is 
introduced in the bank capital regulation. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II details the data and the 
graphical analysis. Section III outlines the econometric approach adopted to conduct our 
empirical analysis. Section IV presents the results. Section V details the different robustness 
checks that we undertake and section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Data and Graphical analysis  
 
Contrary to LRZ who considered a time period of 39 years (from 1965 to 2003), we use a 
rather shorter time period of 15 years (from 1992 to 2006). We recall that our main aim is to 
empirically compare regulated and unregulated (leverage) capital ratios in Europe. Therefore, 
we consider the period corresponding to the Basel I accords which forced banks to satisfy a 
regulatory minimum capital ratio of 8%. The year 2006 is chosen as the end of our time 
period to avoid any impact of regulatory modifications on our results4. 
 
Bankscope Fitch IBCA reported balance sheets and income statements for 1985 
commercial banks for the 16 European countries considered in this paper. Among these 1985 
commercial banks the information on the total capital ratio5 was missing for 1219 banks. 
Moreover, looking at the distribution of this ratio, 24 other banks were considered as outliers. 
Hence, we ended up with the final sample of 742 commercial banks over the period 1992-
2006. All our data come from Bankscope except for the real GDP series which were retrieved 
from Datastream. Appendix A presents the distribution of banks by country. Appendix B 
details several tests conducted to probe the stationarity of our data. 
 
                                                 
3 Two other main differences between GH and our paper can be highlighted: the first is the particular emphasis 
we attach to the role played by bank specific variables on both the leverage and the risk-adjusted capital ratios 
(see Section III for details). Secondly, we develop a graphical analysis which is very important as it gives us first 
hand evidence on bank capital structure and portrays its transitory and permanent nature. 
4 Since 2007 banks shifted to Basel II and currently there are discussions to include the leverage ratio (among 
other things) in the capital regulation menu (Basel III). 
5 The total capital ratio is one of our three dependent variables (see Section III for details). 
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In this section we develop the method borrowed from LRZ. We investigate graphically 
how the initial capital ratios influence the future capital ratios by looking at the evolution of 
bank leverage, tier1 and total risk-based capital ratios for our cross section of banks. This 
graphical approach is well-suited to visualize the comparative persistence and convergence of 
the different bank capital ratios considered in this study. It allows us to basically understand 
how both the regulated and the non regulated capital ratios evolve through time and the 
impact of initial capital ratio on the future capital ratio. 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
To this end, Figure 1 presents the average of a given capital ratio of four bank 
groupings in “event time.” It is constructed in the following manner. First, for each calendar 
year, we sort banks into quartiles that give us four bank groupings according to the level of 
the considered capital ratio (leverage, tier 1 or total capital ratios alternatively), which we 
denote: Very High, High, Medium, and Low. Second, we compute the average capital ratio 
for each grouping at its formation year and in each of the subsequent seven years, holding its 
composition constant. To illustrate, consider for example 1992 which is our first grouping 
formation year. We sort banks and form the grouping representing banks in the first quartile 
and compute the average ratio (only for this group of banks) from 1992 to 1999. We repeat 
these two steps of sorting and averaging for every year in the sample period (15 years from 
1992 to 2006)6. This process generates 15 sets of averages, one for each calendar year in our 
sample. After, we compute the average of the averages ratio within each event time to obtain 
the points in the figure7. We perform this exercise for all the three ratios (leverage, tier1 and 
total risk-based capital ratios), the results of which are presented in Figure 1 for the category 
“all banks”. 
 
The main concern in interpreting Figure 1 is the fact that some banks exit the sample 
either because of bankruptcy or mergers and acquisitions operations as we progress away 
from the grouping formation year (see Table 1). This is particularly troublesome if we 
consider that banks that exit the sample are mainly those with very low capital ratios (through 
                                                 
6 Notice that from 1999 onward, we lose a year in the length of the time we can follow the bank grouping. For 
instance, in 2000, it can only be followed during six years whereas in 2006, the last year of our sample, it is 
impossible to follow the bank grouping. Table 1 detailed below gives an idea about this structure. 
7 On the whole, we have eight event times and the number of averages used to compute the final points within 
each event time decreases as we progress further (from 15 for event time 1 to 8 for event time 8). 
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bankruptcy) or very high capital ratios (through M&A operations8) and therefore the exit may 
mechanically impact the way the capital ratios evolve in the figure.  
 
-Insert Table 1 about here- 
 
Each line of Table 1 shows how the number of banks evolves from the bank grouping 
formation year and the consecutive seven years during which we follow this grouping. For 
instance in 1992, 39 banks have a leverage ratio belonging to the first quartile called “Low” 
and seven years after, in 1999, more than 38 % of the banks have exited the sample. We 
construct similar tables (not presented here due to space considerations) for the three 
remaining categories (Medium, High, Very High) and for the two other capital ratios (Tier 1 
and Total capital ratios). To control for this exiting problem, we therefore repeat the whole 
process of construction of the Figure 1 by constraining the grouping to contain the same 
number of banks from the year of formation up to the end of the period during which we 
maintain the bank grouping constant9. The number of banks used to compute the averages is 
given in italics in the Table 1 and the results are depicted in Figure 1 for survivor banks where 
we notice that the evolution of the capital ratios does not change. 
 
The charts in Figure 1 highlight several features that are worth noting. First, we notice 
an important cross-sectional dispersion at event time 1. For all three ratios, the gap between 
the Very High and the Low groups is substantial: 11.08, 12.29 and 14.28% for the leverage, 
tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios respectively. Second, there is a substantial 
convergence among the four bank groupings averages over time, particularly for the risk-
based capital ratios. For instance, the chart in the middle (for the sample of all banks) shows 
that after 8 years, the Very High Tier 1 capital ratio grouping declined from 18.24% to 
12.96%, whereas the Low grouping increased from 5.95% to 7.65%. The total capital ratio 
groupings display a similar pattern, but the first chart which represents the leverage ratio 
seems to show a slower speed of convergence. Understanding this difference in convergence 
speed is one of the aims of this paper. Finally, despite the convergence, the average capital 
ratio across the bank groupings eight years later remains significantly different for all capital 
ratios. Banks with low capital ratios level at the beginning (event time 1) disclose a low 
                                                 
8 Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) show that bank targets are better capitalized than bank acquirers. 
9 Our robustness check is more restrictive compared to that of LRZ who only require firms to have nonmissing 
data on book leverage at least on 20 out of 39 years.  
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capital ratio level eight years later (event time 8). Overall, we obtain consistent results with 
those of LRZ, particularly on the bank leverage ratio. 
 
The main implication from Figure 1 is that banks’ future leverage and risk-based 
capital ratios are closely related to their initial leverage and risk-based capital ratios consistent 
with the persistence of bank capital structure. However, despite this persistent phenomenon, 
we notice that bank capital ratios tend to converge towards their targets at different pace. The 
risk-adjusted capital ratios disclose high speed of convergence compared to the leverage ratio. 
However, the charts provide limited quantitative evidence of the initial ratios’ economic 
importance. To measure the impact of initial bank capital ratios on future bank capital ratios 
and thoroughly investigate the question of convergence, we therefore proceed 
econometrically. 
 
III. Econometric procedure 
 
In this section we discuss how we empirically test the first hand evidence shown in 
Figure 1. We firstly examine the question of the persistence of the bank capital structure and 
then we go through the investigation related to the different speeds of convergence between 
the leverage and the risk-adjusted capital ratios.  
For the first question, our procedure is close to that of LRZ who test whether the initial 
leverage explains much of the future firms’ leverage. We estimate an econometric model of 
the following form: 
 ( )5 6, , , , ,
1 1
      1i t i o c i t d i t t i t
c d
Cap Cap T BSα β γ δ ν ε
= =
= + + + + +∑ ∑  
,i oCap , T, and BS stand for initial capital, traditional and bank specific variables as detailed in 
Appendix C. The parameter β  associated with the first component is the one of great 
importance. Subscripts i  and t  denote bank and period respectively. We include in the 
regression time fixed effects10 tν  to account for unobserved heterogeneity across time that 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables.  
                                                 
10 We do not consider country fixed effects as GH because our sample is less heterogeneous by excluding the 
American banks. We also hope to capture them through the variables in the second component (T): economic 
cycle and the competition computed at the country level. However, for comparison reasons, several robustness 
checks regarding fixed effects and model specification were undertaken (see Section V for details). 
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In this model, the dependent variable Cap represents the bank capital structure. We 
consider three alternative dependent variables: in addition to the leverage ratio, defined as 
Total equity divided by Total assets, traditionally used in the corporate literature; we also 
consider the tier 1 and the total capital ratios11 respectively defined as Tier 1 capital/ Risk 
weighted assets and Total capital/ Risk weighted assets. These two variables allow us to take 
into account the specificity of banks that appears in the bank capital regulation reflected in the 
minimum regulatory capital requirement imposed by the Basel accords. Our aim is to 
compare how the determinants of bank capital structure, particularly the first (initial capital) 
and the third (bank specific variables) components influence the unregulated and regulated 
capital ratios. In this way, we are able not only to compare our results to those by LRZ for 
non financial firms, but also extend the study by GH by tracking how within banking firms 
regulated and unregulated capital ratios respond to the impact exercised by the different 
determinants described below. Concerning the independent variables, beyond the initial 
capital borrowed from LRZ, the paper draws heavily on previous works that have looked into 
how banks choose their capital structure. We identify several factors and classify them into 
traditional and bank specific variables. Now, we describe the three different sets of 
independent variables.  
The first set is made of initial capital ( ,i oCap ). It means the initial leverage or the initial 
tier 1 or total capital ratios which are the first nonmissing values of these ratios. They should 
have a significant positive impact on future bank capital ratios in accordance with the 
persistence phenomenon found in Figure 1. In order to isolate the part of bank capital 
structure explained by this first component we control for two other components. The first 
component, which is the second set of independent variables, controls for shared factors 
generally found to influence both financial and non financial capital structure. We call them 
traditional variables (T). They are size, equity cost which should be negatively linked to bank 
capital ratios and profit, economic cycle, and competition which are supposed to have a 
positive impact on bank capital ratios12. The second component, and hence the last set of 
independent variables, consists of the bank specific features (as opposed to non financial 
firms) embedded in the bank balance sheet. We try to capture the effect of the credit risk and 
the asset structure from the asset side and the impact of market discipline by looking at the 
type of bank creditors from the liability side in order to assess their impact on capital ratios. 
                                                 
11 Definitions of all variables in italics can also be found in Appendix C along with their descriptive statistics and 
the expected signs of their coefficients. 
12 The explanations for the expected impact of the traditional variables on the bank capital ratios are intuitive and 
could be found in Alfon et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2008) for instance. 
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For this purpose, we consider the ratio of Loan loss provision over Total assets as the credit 
risk variable and a prudent behavior should be associated with a positive relationship between 
this variable and the bank capital ratios. We also consider the variables credit demand-
measured as the annual net loan growth rate, and credit activity- corresponding to the 
proportion of net loans in total assets that should be negatively related to the bank capital 
ratios. Indeed, an increase in assets through the demand of credit should decrease the capital 
ratio as the denominator increases all else being equal (Ayuso et al. (2004)). We also know 
that the Basel I accords were mainly designed to deal with bank credit activities. Despite the 
1996 modifications to include market risks, it is generally agreed that they remain ill-suited 
for market activities (BIS (2009)) and hence we may expect that banks highly involved in the 
credit activities could operate with low capital ratios by comparison. 
To assess the market discipline effect, we construct two quantitative indicators (Nier and 
Baumann (2006)) and a price indicator (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)). Therefore, we 
consider the proportion of all market fundings in total liabilities and the proportion of bank 
deposits
13 in total liabilities. From the market discipline point of view, we expect a positive 
relationship between these two variables and the dependent variables reflecting the pressure 
emanating from uninsured debt holders. We add a third market discipline variable as a price 
indicator termed Liability cost equal to the ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing debt. 
We assume that if the debt is not completely insured, market discipline makes banks 
substitute capital to debt when their cost increases. Thus, we expect a positive link between 
Liability cost and our dependent variables. 
 
One major difficulty for our analysis is that some of the independent variables are 
likely to be endogenous, i.e. themselves dependent on bank capital. While the initial capital 
variable ( ,i oCap ) is strictly exogenous, endogeneity is likely to be a problem for some of the 
traditional and the bank specific variables. In particular, banks that hold little capital may 
have to rely on attracting bank deposits or other uninsured funding in order to fund their 
assets. This would result in a negative relationship between capital and the bank deposit ratio 
and between capital and the ratio of uninsured liabilities. On the other hand, banks that hold 
little equity capital could be perceived as risky by investors. This could increase their cost of 
uninsured funding and reduce their reliance on such funds, resulting in a positive relationship 
between capital and bank deposits and between capital and uninsured liabilities. Potential 
                                                 
13 Bank deposits are deposits received from other banks and they are not explicitly insured. 
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endogeneity biases therefore need to be addressed by a suitable choice of estimation method. 
The two closest papers to ours (Lemmon et al. (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) have 
dealt with this issue by using lagged variables in the Panel pooled OLS. We rather opt for a 
more appropriate GMM technique and the pooled OLS is used as a robustness check14. All 
our variables were instrumented except those representing the initial capital, or at the country 
level (economic cycle) or those variables for the credit demand (which is a growth rate) and 
the bank size as they are obviously exogenous. As regards to the set of instruments, we follow 
the literature and consider lagged values of the concerned endogenous variable consistent 
with the satisfaction of the Sargan J-statistic for over-identification restrictions.  
 
Concerning our second point, we take a step further to closely examine the question of 
convergence. Our aim is to empirically assess the findings shown in Figure 1 where risk-
adjusted bank capital ratios seem to converge towards bank capital targets faster than the 
simple leverage ratio. In this perspective, we transform equation (1) into a partial adjustment 
model as it is traditionally the case both in the corporate literature (Flannery and Rangan 
(2006)) and the banking literature (Flannery and Rangan (2008), Berger et al. (2008), Brewer 
et al. (2008)). The partial adjustment model is derived from: 
( ), , ,  2di t i t i tCap Cap ω∆ = ∆ + where the observed change in a banking institution’s capital ratio 
at any time is decomposed into a discretionary adjustment to its targeted equilibrium ratio and 
an adjustment caused by exogenous current events. Given that the bank may not be able to 
adjust its target equilibrium capital ratio instantaneously, expression ( )2  can be modified and 
modelled in a partial adjustment framework. It becomes: 
 ( ) ( ), , , 1 ,  3i t i t i t i tCap Cap Capλ ω∗ −∆ = − +  where ,i tCap∗  is the desired capital ratio and it is 
assumed to be given by expression ( )1 . [ ]0,1λ ∈  stands for the speed of adjustment (SOA)15 
in which we are interested. The rest of the paper discusses the results and different robustness 
checks performed to probe their strength. 
 
 
 
IV. Results 
 
                                                 
14 See footnote 10. 
15 Notice that ( )3 can be re-written as: ( )
, , 1 , ,
1  
i t i t i t i t
Cap Cap Capλ λ ε∗
−
= − + + and hence, the SOA can be easily 
derived by taking 1 minus the coefficient associated with the dependent lagged variable. 
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Tables 2 and 3 give our main results obtained respectively with models ( )1  and ( )3  . 
We start by describing the results contained in Table 2.  
 
-Insert Table 2 about here- 
 
In each column (1) of Table 2, we present the results of a model specification 
consisting solely of the initial capital variable, that is initial leverage or initial risk-based 
capital ratios, which is one of our main focus because it enables us to compare our results to 
those by LRZ for non financial firms. The coefficient is statistically and economically highly 
significant for all three dependent variables in columns (I), (II), and (III) indicating that the 
future bank capital ratio highly depends on its initial capital ratio. We can see that a one unit 
change in initial leverage, tier1 and total capital ratios result respectively in 73%, 57% and 
53% change in future bank leverage, tier1 and total capital ratios. This result is consistent 
with the permanent feature of leverage ratio found by LRZ for corporate firms. Moreover it is 
consistent with our Figure 1 which discloses a more persistent phenomenon for the leverage 
than for the risk-adjusted capital ratios as the coefficient is on average a quarter higher for the 
former. Hence, this quantitative result confirms the graphical one found in figure 1 which 
shows that despite convergence, banks with low or high capital ratios remain as such on 
average seven years after. Next, we add two sets of variables in the model16. The first set 
(column (2)) corresponds to the traditional variables which may influence bank capital ratios. 
The coefficient estimates are all consistent with previous literature, in terms of sign and 
significance for the three dependent variables, except for the competition variable which is not 
significant for the tier1 ratio dependent variable (II). The final set consists of bank specific 
variables added in two separate waves in order to ease the comparison between the impact 
they have on the leverage with that on the risk-adjusted capital ratios. Our aim here is to 
compare the impact of the bank specific determinants on formally regulated capital ratios 
(risk-adjusted capital ratios) and unregulated leverage ratio17. Column (3) contains the results 
with the addition of variables reflecting the bank specificities at the asset side. Coefficients 
have the expected negative sign significant at the 1% for the three dependent variables except 
for the credit risk variable which is not significant. The notable difference is in the 
                                                 
16 Although the magnitude of the coefficient of the initial capital variable decreases once we add other 
explanatory variables, it remains economically significant across all the specifications. 
17 In this way, we can test the relevance of capital regulation on bank capital structure and complement the recent 
results by Gropp and Heider (2010).   
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coefficients’ magnitude where those associated with the risk-adjusted capital ratios are 3 to 7 
times higher than those associated with the leverage ratio. Column (4) gives the results where 
we incorporate the last sub-set of bank capital structure determinants related to market 
discipline reflected in the bank liability side. As expected from the market discipline 
perspective, the three added variables Market fundings, Bank deposits and Liability cost have 
positive and significant coefficients at the 1% for the total risk-based capital ratio. By 
contrast, none of the three variables comes out as expected for the leverage ratio. The only 
significant variable Bank deposits has a negative coefficient which does not play the role of 
market discipline. Instead, this result is consistent with the substitution effect theorized by 
Gorton and Winton (2000). When the bank increases its financing with the bank deposits, 
then it will lower its recourse on capital. Hence, even though the same Bank deposits variable 
is not significant for the tier 1 capital ratio, the results in column (4) establish a stark 
difference between the risk-adjusted dependent variable and the leverage ratio. Hence, it 
clearly appears that, at least in Europe, uninsured creditors seem to discipline only the risk-
based capital ratios, which is formally regulated. Another notable feature to highlight is the 
stability of our coefficients in terms of magnitude, signs and significance across all the model 
specifications. 
 
To better grasp the effect of each added set of variables from model specification (1) 
to (4) used to explain the future leverage and the risk-based capital ratios, we compare the R-
squares (together with their variations) disclosed in the last two rows of Table 2. First, we find 
that the initial capital variable captures, in absolute terms, much of the future capital ratio 
consistent with the findings by LRZ who find similar results concerning corporate capital 
leverage. In relative terms however, we notice that the initial capital variable is more 
important for the leverage regression (64.54% in column (I.1)) than for the risk-based capital 
ratios regression (53% and 44.35% column (1) in regressions II and III respectively). This is 
consistent with the charts from Figure 1 which shows a higher persistent pattern for the 
leverage ratio than for risk-based capital ratios. In other words, while the regulated capital 
ratios are influenced by the initial capital, this influence is more pronounced for the 
unregulated (or the leverage) capital ratio. Hence, our suspicion that the bank capital 
regulation might play a prominent part in the explanation of the risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
Second, the traditional variables contribute to the explanation of the future leverage ratio 
more than to the explanation of the future risk-based capital ratios as the increase in the R-
square is more than 14% in the first case whereas it is less than 6% on average in the second 
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case. The opposite occurs when we consider the contribution of the bank specific variables as 
they do not add that much to the explanation of the future leverage capital ratio (less than 
0.5% increase18) whereas they contribute more than 12% on average for the explanation of the 
future risk-based capital ratios. Now, we discuss the results contained in Table 3 obtained 
with the partial adjustment model ( )3 . 
  
-Insert Table 3 about here- 
 
We follow LRZ and progressively add different sets of determinants of the target bank 
capital in order to compare factors responsible for the speed of adjustment (SOA) variation. 
We maintain the same procedure as previously (Table 2) except the addition of the first 
column which gives the SOA when the target specification is solely made of the intercept 
term. The coefficient in the first row (SOA) is our main focus for understating the different 
speeds of convergence between the leverage and the risk-adjusted capital ratios highlighted on 
Figure 1. Consistent with the graphical analysis, we can see that the SOA is 2 times higher at 
least in every column of Table 3 for the risk-adjusted capital ratios than for the leverage. 
Every column (2) of the three dependent variables shows that the initial capital variable 
remains highly significant despite the presence of the one year lagged dependent variable and 
that the SOA increases (in relative terms19) of 52.88%, 19.21% and 29.84% respectively for 
the leverage, Tier 1 and the Total capital ratios. This empirical result corroborates the 
persistent phenomenon found in Figure 1. Moreover, consistent with the first empirical 
evidence in Table 2, the addition of the bank specific variables (Columns (4) and (5)) has very 
stark different impact on the SOA of the leverage and the risk-adjusted capital ratios. Whereas 
the risk-adjusted capital SOA increases of more than 5%, that of the leverage ratio does not 
increase (it rather decreases!). We can also notice that 2 out of 3 market discipline indicators 
are significant with positive coefficients whereas none of them is significant for the leverage 
ratio. 
 
Overall, we get very sensible results consistent with the current practice in the banking 
regulation in Europe that only focuses on the risk-based capital ratios. This is shown by the 
relative great importance of initial leverage on future leverage on the one hand, and the 
                                                 
18 Although this increase is small, the added variables jointly contribute significantly to the explanatory power of 
the model as indicated by the Wald test. 
19 The relative variation is computed as: ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1 / 1SOA SOA SOA− . 
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irrelevance of market discipline on future leverage on the other hand. In other words, our 
results may suggest that the fact that risk-based capital ratios are formally under capital 
regulation with specified minimum thresholds to be respected makes market participants care 
about their evolution. We conjecture that the potential introduction of the leverage capital 
ratio into the bank capital regulation menu could dampen the weight of initial leverage ratio 
that it has on its future trend and it could be more sensitive to market discipline20. 
V. Robustness tests 
 
In this section we report a number of robustness checks that were undertaken to verify 
the overall strength of our results. In particular, we introduce a number of changes to the 
benchmark specifications shown in Tables 2 and 3 and check whether the results change 
significantly. To save space, we only report results with two dependent variables as results 
with the Tier 1 are quite similar to those with the total risk-based capital ratio. First, one can 
suspect that the magnitude of our R-squares are probably largely due to the inclusion of time 
fixed effects. To isolate their contribution to the model explanation, we re-run the model 
without the time fixed effects and compare the R-squares. The results are presented in Table 
4. Overall, we find our results and conclusions with regards to the variable signs and 
significance, and the R-squares magnitude and variation to be robust to the exclusion of time 
fixed effects. The highest decline in the R-square is less than 3% for model specification II 
(2). 
-Insert Table 4 about here- 
 
Second, one could also argue that our benchmark regression does not completely take 
into account all the bank’s aspects that might differ across countries despite the inclusion of 
two variables specific to each country (economic cycle and competition variables). In order to 
make sure that this potential lack does not distort our findings, we add a set of country 
dummy variables. Table 5 shows the results of this test. Overall, we find our results and 
conclusions to be robust to the inclusion of the country fixed effects. The only notable effect 
is the loss of the significance for the competition variable in all specifications as the country 
fixed effects capture its contribution. The same is true for the economic cycle variable which 
is significant only for the total risk-based capital ratio.  
 
                                                 
20 A study that compares American and European banks could be one way to test this conjecture.  
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-Insert Table 5 about here- 
 Third, the two previous studies Lemmon et al.(2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) 
that are close to our paper and to which we compare our results have used the Panel Pooled 
Least Square (OLS) method. Thus, we re-estimate our models using the Pooled OLS in which 
the instruments replace the independent variables in order to dampen the endogeneity issue. 
Table 6 contains the results. Note that this robustness check allows us to verify if our results 
are very sensitive to the estimation method. Once again, we find that the choice of the 
econometric method does not have a marked effect on the interpretation of our results and 
conclusions. 
 
-Insert Table 6 about here- 
 
 We performed another set of robustness checks not reported here but available upon 
request concerning our model specifications and our sample. For instance, we alternatively 
used pooled OLS with bank fixed effects and the Dynamic GMM using the Arellano and 
Bond (1998) first difference estimator which is believed to be better suited for studying the 
question of the speed of adjustment21. As argued in GH, we found higher SOA (more than 2 
times) and higher R-squares (more than 20% and 30% respectively for the leverage and total 
risk-based capital ratios) but our conclusions remained mainly unchanged. As regards to our 
sample, countries are not equally represented. In particular, France and Italy are highly 
represented by comparison. Moreover, capital regulation is somewhat different in UK where 
the Financial Stability Authority (FSA) sets two different capital ratios for each bank22. 
Hence, we alternatively exclude France and Italy, and UK in our sample and re-run all our 
regressions. We find that all our conclusions were unaffected. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Initial capital variable which is stable through time was excluded. 
22 A ‘trigger ratio’, which is the minimum individual capital ratio; and a ‘target ratio’ set above the trigger. The 
‘target ratio’ acts as a warning light and as a cushion of capital to help prevent an accidental breach of the 
individual capital requirement (Alfon et al. (2004)). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines empirically whether on the one hand the recent results found in 
the corporate literature by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) which indicates that much of 
the future firm leverage is explained by the initial leverage applies to the bank capital 
structure.  On the other hand, we complement the study by Gropp and Heider (2010) who 
investigated the role played by the capital regulation in the bank capital structure. To do so, 
we use a homogenous sample of European commercial banks from 16 different countries 
from 1992 to 2006, a period during which the banking capital regulation has not changed and 
systematically compare the behavior of the unregulated leverage ratio to that of the regulated 
risk-based capital ratios. 
Overall, consistent with the findings from the corporate literature, we find that bank 
capital structure is quite stable over long periods of time: banks that have relatively high (low) 
capital ratios tend to remain as such for over eight years. Moreover, as we analyze separately 
the risk-based capital ratios (tier 1 and total capital ratios) and the non risk-based capital ratio 
(leverage capital ratio), we find graphically a significant difference in the speed of 
convergence between them: convergence is faster for risk-based capital ratios than for 
leverage capital ratio. More interestingly, the econometric approach confirms this result. It 
shows that the future bank leverage depends on its initial leverage more than do the future 
bank risk-based capital ratios which seem to be rather much more influenced by the market 
discipline and the speed of adjustment of the latter is 2 times at least higher than the former. 
Hence, we think that the lack of a formal inclusion of the leverage ratio in the bank capital 
regulation package in Europe may explain this behavior. We can conclude that by specifying 
a minimum regulatory capital requirement, the Basel accords foster the market discipline 
which acts as a watchdog of the rules and thus ultimately influence the behavior of the risk-
adjusted capital ratios. On the whole, our results are therefore broadly supportive of recent 
policy initiatives that aim to strengthen the bank capital regulation by introducing a regulatory 
minimum for the leverage ratio and by simultaneously improving market discipline.  
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Appendix A: Distribution of banks by country 
 
The sample consists of 742 European commercial banks from Bankscope database from 1992 
to 2006. 
Country  
Number of banks 
Austria 19 
Belgium 18 
Denmark 65 
Finland 11 
France 147 
Germany 28 
Greece 18 
Ireland 14 
Italy 198 
Netherlands 50 
Norway 21 
Portugal 20 
Spain 31 
Sweden 31 
Switzerland 20 
United Kingdom 51 
Total 742 
 
Appendix B: Stationarity of the data 
It is important to check whether our panel data is stationary or not. In this perspective 
we performed four alternative tests (Baltagi, 2008, p.275). Three unit root tests: Levin, Lin 
and Chu (LLC), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), Fisher-ADF and one stationarity test: Hadri. 
Notwithstanding the fact that for small time series T, panel unit root tests have low power and 
thus there is a potential risk of concluding that the whole panel is nonstationary even when 
there is a large proportion of stationary series in the panel (Karlsson and Löthgren (2000)), all 
our 13 variables passed the three tests successfully at the 1% except the credit activity 
variable for which the null hypothesis (the presence of the unit root) is only rejected at 10% 
and the size variable for which we cannot reject the null hypthesis for the IPS and the Fisher-
ADF tests. Concerning the stationarity test Hadri which all our variables fail to pass, the 
rationale may be found in Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) who compare the performance of 
unit root and stationarity tests. They conclude that the stationarity test of Hadri (2000) 
perform poorly by comparison. Indeed, they found that for small time series, { }10,15T ∈ 23, it 
tends to reject stationarity most of the times even for highly stationary series and hence, they 
infer that it is hard to conduct such test for short times series. 
                                                 
23 Which is our case as T=15. 
Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and definitions of the variables 
Variables Definition Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Min 
No. of 
obs. 
Expected Sign of 
the coeff. 
Dependent variables  
      
 
Leverage ratio Total Equity/Total assets 8.06 6.79 4.98 46.55 0.26 4561  
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio Tier 1 capital / Risk weighted assets 10.71 8.90 5.79 41.22 0.10 3130  
Total risk-based capital ratio Total capital (Tier1+Tier 2) / Risk weighted assets 14.25 12.20 6.42 41.70 0.10 4568  
Initial capital variables  
      
 
Initial Leverage The first nonmissing value for leverage ratio 8.14 6.68 5.36 46.55 0.66 4914 + 
Initial Tier 1 capital ratio The first nonmissing value for Tier 1 capital ratio 11.21 9.20 6.83 41.22 0.10 3401 + 
Initial Total capital ratio The first nonmissing value for Total capital ratio 14.82 12.30 7.39 41.70 0.10 4940 + 
Traditional variables  
      
 
Size Logarithm of total assets 15.01 14.79 2.27 21.18 9.16 4568 - 
Profit Post tax profit/ Total assets 0.67 0.59 1.10 10.60 -12.38 4542 + 
Equity cost24 Return on equity(ROE) = Net income/ Equity 9.39 9.51 12.55 98.46 -99.81 4525 - 
Economic cycle Annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product (deseasonalized) 2.30 2.19 1.68 15.43 -3.98 4413 + 
The average leverage ratio of the bank’s 
competitors per year and per country 8.06 7.86 2.01 15.06 2.62 4566 
+ 
The average tier1 risk-based capital ratio of the 
bank’s competitors per year and per country 10.55 10.75 2.08 20.94 4.70 4564 
+ 
Competition 
The average total risk-based capital ratio of the 
bank’s competitors per year and per country 14.25 13.73 2.11 22.15 8.10 4566 
+ 
Bank specific variables  
      
 
Credit risk Loan loss provisions/ Total assets 0.54 0.34 0.68 6.58 0.00 3864 + 
Credit demand Annual net loan growth 13.56 10.05 28.94 272.87 -100.00 3887 - 
Credit activity Net loans/ Total assets 54.66 56.23 22.33 98.87 0.00 4561 - 
Market fundings Total market fundings25/ Total liabilities 23.95 19.53 20.02 100.00 0.40 4568 + 
Bank deposits Bank deposits/Total liabilities 23.13 16.89 22.06 99.29 0.00 4514 + 
Liability cost Interest expense/Total liabilities  4.01  3.37 2.80  29.24  0.01 4520 + 
                                                 
24 ROE and profit are highly correlated. Therefore, we proceed by orthogonalization and use the resids obtained by regressing ROE on profit as the equity cost variable. 
25 Total market fundings corresponds to Total Liabilities minus Total Deposits and Net loans are gross loans minus loan loss reserves. 
Figure 1: The Evolution of risk-based and non risk-based capital ratios. 
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Table 1: Number of banks used to compute the leverage ratio evolution for the bank 
grouping “Low”. 
 
 
 
     Event time (years) 
  
Port. form. year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
        
 
1992 39 39 38 38 37 36 27 24 
1993 57 53 52 51 48 36 31 28 
1994 66 60 58 53 42 34 32 26 
1995 75 72 67 53 40 39 34 31 
1996 79 70 58 41 36 31 27 25 
1997 81 60 42 36 33 28 26 26 
1998 80 53 46 39 36 33 32 33 
1999 87 71 65 58 54 49 46 46 
2000 81 73 64 59 55 50 50 0 
2001 85 72 65 61 55 57 0 0 
2002 81 74 67 61 60 0 0 0 
2003 81 73 60 62 0 0 0 0 
2004 80 65 67 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 86 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2: The effect of initial capital, traditional and bank specific variables on future bank capital ratios. 
Variables Leverage ratio (I) Tier1 risk-based capital ratio (II) Total risk-based capital ratio (III) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
             
Initial capital 
Initial capital ratio  0.7343  0.4643  0.4658  0.4697  0.5759  0.5035  0.4673  0.4700  0.5350  0.4637  0.4148  0.4096 
 (69.55)*** (33.69)*** (33.28)*** (33.68)*** (47.09)*** (35.77)*** (33.52)*** (33.65)*** (45.83)*** (35.24)*** (31.02)*** (30.68)*** 
Traditional variables 
Size  -0.3179 -0.3167 -0.3143  -0.1994 -0.3207 -0.4228  -0.1703 -0.2890 -0.3804 
  (-12.61)*** (-12.23)*** (-11.25)***  (-4.76)*** (-7.86)*** (-9.81)***  (-4.44)*** (-7.39)*** (-8.77)*** 
Profit   1.4325  1.4796  1.4723   0.9115  1.1812  1.3217   0.5972  0.7957  0.9206 
  (17.16)*** (17.72)*** (17.34)***  (6.19)*** (8.56)*** (9.37)***  (4.81)*** (6.77)*** (7.60)*** 
Equity cost  -0.1151 -0.1076 -0.1051  -0.0542 -0.0667 -0.0628  -0.0684 -0.0552 -0.0521 
  (-9.55)*** (-8.79)*** (-8.58)***  (-2.60)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.16)***  (-3.71)*** (-3.11)*** (-2.93)*** 
Economic cycle   0.0687  0.0731  0.0776   0.1131  0.1423  0.2082   0.1710  0.1799  0.2217 
  (2.10)** (2.23)** (2.33)**  (2.00)** (2.69)*** (3.90)***  (3.17)*** (3.53)*** (4.30)*** 
Competition   0.1452  0.1435  0.1258   0.0135  0.0512  0.1086   0.2076  0.2164  0.2395 
  (5.21)*** (5.12)*** (4.30)***  (0.24) (0.99) (2.08)**  (4.59)*** (5.03)*** (5.53)*** 
Bank specific variables 
Credit risk    0.2138  0.2696   -0.2531 -0.1061    0.0134  0.0669 
   (1.55) (1.95)*   (-0.90) (-0.37)   (0.06) (0.30) 
Credit demand   -0.0056 -0.0048   -0.0206 -0.0198   -0.0188 -0.0189 
   (-2.82)*** (-2.41)**   (-6.89)*** (-6.59)***   (-6.14)*** (-6.16)*** 
Credit activity   -0.0079 -0.0103   -0.0557 -0.0681   -0.0561 -0.0620 
   (-3.09)*** (-3.79)***   (-13.43)*** (-15.15)***   (-13.83)*** (-14.31)*** 
Market fundings     0.0026     0.0296     0.0178 
    (0.86)    (6.46)***    (3.78)*** 
Bank deposits    -0.0132     0.0024     0.0116 
    (-5.21)***    (0.58)    (2.99)*** 
Liability cost      0.0245     0.1338     0.1328 
    (0.93)    (3.23)***    (3.22)*** 
Intercept  2.0743  6.6667  7.0203  7.3203  3.8693  6.7944  12.0917  12.1272  5.8022  5.5987  11.2317  11.3107 
 (21.60)*** (12.19)*** (12.19)*** (12.46)*** (26.52)*** (6.36)*** (11.37)*** (11.27)*** (33.02)*** (6.04)*** (11.67)*** (11.69)*** 
             
N° of obs.  2733 2733 2733 2733 2019 2019 2019 2019 2741 2741 2741 2741 
R²  0.6454 0.7412 0.7420 0.7456 0.5300 0.5582 0.6178 0.6222 0.4435 0.4718 0.5285 0.5343 
% increase in R²  14.84% 0.11% 0.49%  5.32% 10.68% 0.71%  6.38% 12.02% 1.10% 
             All variables are described in Appendix C. *, **, *** mean significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively and t-statistics are between parentheses. Column (1) of any of the three dependent 
variables: Leverage capital ratio (I), Tier1 risk-based capital ratio (II) and the Total risk-based capital ratio (III) presents the results with only one regressor called the initial capital ratio. Column (2) 
gives the results with five more variables called traditional variables. The subsequent columns (3) and (4) correspond to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves 
starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. 
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Table 3: Speed of adjustment: comparative convergence between risk and non-risk adjusted bank capital ratios. 
All variables are described in Appendix C. *, **, *** mean significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively and t-statistics are between parentheses. Column (1) of any of the three dependent 
variables: Leverage capital ratio (I), Tier1 risk-based capital ratio (II) and The total risk-based capital ratio (III) gives the speed of adjustment (SOA) when the target specification ,i tcap∗  is solely 
made of the intercept term. Columns (2) and (3) present the results when the initial capital and the traditional variables are respectively added. The subsequent columns (4) and (5) correspond to the 
inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. 
Variables Leverage ratio (I) Tier1 risk-based capital ratio (II) Total risk-based capital ratio (III) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Speed of adjustment 
SOA 0.0607 0.0928 0.1328 0.1230 0.1249 0.1770 0.2110 0.2320 0.2597 0.2664 0.1746 0.2267 0.2447 0.2585 0.2622 
 (9.28)*** (7.73)*** (9.56)*** (8.97)*** (9.08)*** (16.94)*** (12.41)*** (13.77)*** (15.54)*** (15.88)*** (17.96)*** (15.89)*** (16.89)*** (17.87)*** (18.11)*** 
% increase in SOA 
 52.88% 43.10% -7.38% 1.54%  19.21% 9.95% 11.94% 2.58%  29.84% 7.94% 5.64% 1.43%
Initial capital 
Init. cap. rat.   0.0351  0.0200  0.0230  0.0246   0.0362  0.0104  0.0311  0.0367   0.0593  0.0422  0.0478  0.0484 
  (3.18)*** (1.81)* (2.12)** (2.25)**  (2.53)** (0.72) (2.28)** (2.68)***  (4.96)*** (3.44)*** (4.06)*** (4.13)*** 
Traditional variables 
Size   -0.1055 -0.1008 -0.1063   -0.0539 -0.0882 -0.1272   -0.0454 -0.0708 -0.1004 
   (-6.38)*** (-6.05)*** (-5.92)***   (-1.85)* (-3.06)*** (-4.14)***   (-1.67)* (-2.51)** (-3.20)*** 
Profit    0.1276  0.1665  0.1709    0.6810  0.8209  0.8811    0.2305  0.3747  0.4272 
   (2.17)** (2.89)*** (2.92)***   (6.85)*** (8.73)*** (9.14)***   (2.62)*** (4.47)*** (4.92)*** 
Equity cost   -0.0014  0.0110  0.0116   -0.0598 -0.0494 -0.0485   -0.0411 -0.0221 -0.0221 
   (-0.18) (1.33) (1.40)   (-4.24)*** (-3.62)*** (-3.56)***   (-3.15)*** (-1.74)* (-1.73)* 
Econ. cycle    0.0230  0.0333  0.0388    0.041215  0.085483  0.109893    0.0472  0.0724  0.0808 
   (1.08) (1.60) (1.82)*   (1.04) (2.30)** (2.91)***   (1.23) (1.99)** (2.19)** 
Competition    0.0507  0.0481  0.0483   -0.0506 -0.0400 -0.0166    0.0755  0.0642  0.0741 
   (2.81)*** (2.70)*** (2.59)***   (-1.31) (-1.09) (-0.45)   (2.35)** (2.08)** (2.37)** 
Bank specific variables 
Cred. risk     0.1767  0.1907     0.3253  0.3720     0.3114  0.3113 
    (2.03)** (2.16)**    (1.59) (1.82)*    (2.01)** (2.00)** 
Cred. dem.    -0.0135 -0.0133    -0.0280 -0.0276    -0.0282 -0.0286 
    (-10.52)*** (-10.32)***    (-12.52)*** (-12.33)***    (-12.87)*** (-13.03)*** 
Cred. activ.    -0.0074 -0.0084    -0.0207 -0.0256    -0.0206 -0.0216 
    (-4.60)*** (-4.84)***    (-6.86)*** (-7.77)***    (-6.94)*** (-6.76)*** 
Mark. fund.      0.0022      0.0108      0.0036 
     (1.13)     (3.32)***     (1.06) 
Bank dep.     -0.0024      0.0024      0.0094 
     (-1.50)     (0.81)     (3.40)*** 
Liab. cost       0.0059      0.0564      0.0517 
     (0.3509)     (1.9641)**     (1.7627)* 
Intercept  0.4801  0.4563  1.9334  2.2330  2.3235  1.6411  1.6032  2.9845  4.7013  4.6973  2.2224  2.0964  1.9126  3.7792  3.6514 
 (8.25)*** (7.79)*** (5.36)*** (6.00)*** (6.09)*** (14.47)*** (14.03)*** (4.02)*** (6.22)*** (6.10)*** (16.09)*** (14.99)*** (2.91)*** (5.41)*** (5.18)*** 
N° of obs.  2733 2733 2733 2733 2733 1882 1882 1882 1882 1882 2741 2741 2741 2741 2741 
R² 0.0430 0.0466 0.0998 0.1359 0.1390 0.1490 0.1519 0.1986 0.2976 0.3034 0.1161 0.1241 0.1383 0.2193 0.2264 
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Table 4: Without both time and country fixed effects 
Variables Leverage ratio (I) Total risk-based capital ratio (II) ∆  Leverage ratio (III) ∆ Total risk-based capital ratio (IV) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SOA 
        0.0622 0.0936 0.1342 0.1223 0.1250 0.1730 0.2150 0.2387 0.2563 0.2610 
         (9.56)*** (7.80)*** (9.66)*** (8.93)*** (9.09)*** (17.82)*** (15.22)*** (16.41)*** (17.73)*** (18.05)*** 
In. cap. rat. 0.7344 0.4688 0.4738 0.4759 0.5279 0.4520 0.4116 0.4106  0.0344 0.0196 0.0258 0.0272  0.0483 0.0339 0.0470 0.0498 
 (69.55)*** (34.80)*** (34.59)*** (34.69)*** (44.59)*** (34.58)*** (31.13)*** (31.24)***  (3.11)*** (1.78)* (2.40)** (2.50)**  (4.08)*** (2.79)*** (4.04)*** (4.30)*** 
Size  -0.3098 -0.3055 -0.3087  -0.1812 -0.2806 -0.3638   -0.1069 -0.0942 -0.1004   -0.0470 -0.0635 -0.0901 
  (-12.42)*** (-11.86)*** (-11.13)***  (-4.71)*** (-7.25)*** (-8.53)***   (-6.53)*** (-5.68)*** (-5.61)***   (-1.73)* (-2.28)** (-2.92)*** 
Profit  1.4324 1.4685 1.4531  0.5089 0.7809 0.9260   0.1159 0.1539 0.1556   0.1766 0.3690 0.4247 
  (17.11)*** (17.46)*** (17.01)***  (4.10)*** (6.63)*** (7.56)***   (1.96)* (2.65)*** (2.64)***   (2.01)** (4.39)*** (4.84)*** 
Equity cost  -0.1118 -0.1042 -0.1019  -0.0831 -0.0584 -0.0531   -0.0036 0.0114 0.0119   -0.0479 -0.0225 -0.0217 
  (-9.44)*** (-8.51)*** (-8.30)***  (-4.52)*** (-3.27)*** (-2.96)***   (-0.44) (1.39) (1.43)   (-3.68)*** (-1.76)* (-1.69)* 
Econ. cycle  0.0514 0.0558 0.0625  0.1780 0.1678 0.1732   0.0111 0.0238 0.0281   0.0336 0.0618 0.0596 
  (1.99)** (2.15)** (2.37)**  (4.13)*** (4.11)*** (4.23)***   (0.66) (1.44) (1.67)*   (1.10) (2.12)** (2.03)** 
Competition  0.1604 0.1677 0.1446  0.2663 0.2300 0.2355   0.0448 0.0532 0.0498   0.0921 0.0626 0.0657 
  (5.85)*** (6.11)*** (5.00)***  (6.24)*** (5.64)*** (5.64)***   (2.50)** (3.04)*** (2.69)***   (3.03)*** (2.13)** (2.18)** 
Cred. risk   0.1187 0.1804   0.2153 0.1666    0.1606 0.1792    0.3951 0.3541 
   (0.94) (1.41)   (1.05) (0.81)    (2.00)** (2.20)**    (2.72)*** (2.42)** 
Cred. dem.   -0.0057 -0.0049   -0.0195 -0.0193    -0.0135 -0.0133    -0.0285 -0.0288 
   (-2.84)*** (-2.48)**   (-6.37)*** (-6.35)***    (-10.6)*** (-10.4)***    (-13.1)*** (-13.2)*** 
Cred. act.   -0.0060 -0.0086   -0.0590 -0.0624    -0.0068 -0.0078    -0.0211 -0.0210 
   (-2.47)** (-3.27)***   (-15.14)*** (-14.97)***    (-4.40)*** (-4.63)***    (-7.38)*** (-6.84)*** 
Mark. fund.    0.0036    0.0167     0.0022     0.0033 
    (1.19)    (3.58)***     (1.13)     (0.99) 
Bank dep.    -0.0122    0.0108     -0.0024     0.0091 
    (-4.88)***    (2.80)***     (-1.52)     (3.32)*** 
Liab. cost     -0.0070    0.1431     -0.0056     0.0468 
    (-0.30)    (4.00)***     (-0.38)     (1.83)* 
Intercept 2.0744 6.4210 6.5737 7.1003 5.9012 5.1319 11.0606 11.1912 0.4917 0.4690 2.0542 2.0668 2.2528 2.2017 2.0930 1.8052 3.6951 3.6132 
 (21.60)*** (11.96)*** (11.55)*** (12.05)*** (33.09)*** (5.59)*** (11.55)*** (11.68)*** (8.48)*** (8.04)*** (5.81)*** (5.63)*** (5.88)*** (15.95)*** (14.93)*** (2.79)*** (5.33)*** (5.19)*** 
N° of obs.  2733 2733 2733 2733  2741 2741 2741 2741 2733 2733 2733 2733 2733 2741 2741 2741 2741 2741 
R²  0.6454 0.7397 0.7402 0.7438 0.4206 0.4602 0.5243 0.5316 0.0324 0.0359 0.0881 0.1266 0.1280 0.1040 0.1094 0.1240 0.2142 0.2224 
% inc R²/ 
% inc SOA  12.75% 0.07% 0.48%  8.60% 12.23% 1.37%  50,48% 43,38% -8,87% 2,21%  24,28% 11,02% 7,37% 1,83% 
All variables are described in Appendix C. *, **, *** mean significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively and t-statistics are between parentheses. The results of the first two columns (I) and (II) were obtained 
by estimating: ( )
5 6
, , , , ,
1 1
 1  
i t i o c i t d i t i t
c d
Cap Cap T BSα β γ δ ε
= =
′
= + + + +∑ ∑ where ,0icap , T, and BS stand for initial capital, traditional and bank specific. Column (1) of any of the two dependent variables: Leverage capital 
ratio (I) and the Total risk-based capital ratio (II) presents the results with only one regressor called the initial capital ratio. Column (2) gives the results with five more variables called traditional variables. The 
subsequent columns (3) and (4) correspond to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. Results in 
the columns (III) and (IV) were obtained by estimating: ( ) ( )
, , , 1 ,
 3
i t i t i t i t
Cap Cap Capλ ω∗
−
′∆ = − +  where 
,i t
Cap
∗ is given by expression (1′ ) and SOAλ = . Column (1) of any of the two dependent variables: 
Leverage capital ratio (III) and the Total risk-based capital ratio (IV) gives the speed of adjustment (SOA) when the target specification  is solely made of the intercept term. Columns (2) and (3) present 
the results when the initial capital and the traditional variables are respectively added. The subsequent columns (4) and (5) correspond to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different 
waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. 
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Table 5: With both time and country fixed effects 
Variables Leverage ratio (I) Total risk-based capital ratio (II) ∆  Leverage ratio (III) ∆ Total risk-based capital ratio (IV) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SOA 
  0.0761 0.1148 0.1384 0.1302 0.1312 0.1831 0.2343 0.2545 0.2713 0.2738 
 
        (10.41)*** (9.22)*** (9.84)*** (9.43)*** (9.47)*** (18.14)*** (16.27)*** (17.33)*** (18.42)*** (18.65)*** 
In. cap. rat.  0.6904  0.4724  0.4756  0.4785  0.5305  0.4594  0.4089  0.4042   0.0428  0.0257  0.0299  0.0306   0.0606  0.0421  0.0455  0.0460 
 (62.51)*** (32.98)*** (32.85)*** (33.10)*** (43.51)*** (33.69)*** (29.97)*** (29.59)***  (3.82)*** (2.26)** (2.68)*** (2.73)***  (4.92)*** (3.32)*** (3.74)*** (3.79)*** 
Size  -0.2866 -0.2826 -0.2842  -0.2811 -0.3676 -0.4316   -0.0996 -0.0926 -0.1001   -0.0974 -0.1169 -0.1340 
  (-10.57)*** (-10.23)*** (-9.36)***  (-6.54)*** (-8.64)*** (-9.16)***   (-5.59)*** (-5.22)*** (-5.14)***   (-3.15)*** (-3.76)*** (-3.88)*** 
Profit   1.4615  1.5346  1.5298   0.6906  0.9817  1.0344    0.1410  0.2050  0.2041    0.2416  0.4428  0.4713 
  (16.64)*** (17.22)*** (16.93)***  (5.12)*** (7.67)*** (7.98)***   (2.30)** (3.37)*** (3.32)***   (2.49)** (4.75)*** (4.99)*** 
Equity cost  -0.1170 -0.1093 -0.1080  -0.0718 -0.0588 -0.0543   -0.0025  0.0089  0.0094   -0.0439 -0.0260 -0.0247 
  (-9.50)*** (-8.76)*** (-8.64)***  (-3.80)*** (-3.25)*** (-2.99)***   (-0.29) (1.05) (1.11)   (-3.24)*** (-1.97)** (-1.87)* 
Econ. cycle   0.0552  0.0554  0.0646   0.1870  0.1622  0.1778    0.0180  0.0203  0.0232    0.0316  0.0425  0.0448 
  (1.29) (1.29) (1.51)  (2.67)*** (2.44)** (2.68)***   (0.64) (0.74) (0.85)   (0.63) (0.88) (0.93) 
Competition   0.0555  0.0847  0.1000   0.1428  0.0861  0.0971    0.0232  0.0355  0.0417    0.0016 -0.0651 -0.0582 
 
 
 (0.58) (0.88) (1.04)  (1.31) (0.820) (0.93)   (0.37) (0.58) (0.68)   (0.02) (-0.86) (-0.77) 
Risk    0.2442  0.2960    0.4284  0.4227     0.2028  0.2130     0.5173  0.4980 
  
 (1.69)* (2.03)**   (1.89)* (1.85)*    (2.21)** (2.29)**    (3.16)*** (3.01)*** 
Cred. dem.   -0.0068 -0.0059   -0.0181 -0.0185    -0.0141 -0.0139    -0.0281 -0.0287 
  
 (-3.38)*** (-2.93)***   (-5.93)*** (-6.04)***    (-10.9)*** (-10.7)***    (-12.7)*** (-12.9)*** 
Cred. act.   -0.0110 -0.0130   -0.0649 -0.0694    -0.0092 -0.0100    -0.0256 -0.0263 
  
 (-3.98)*** (-4.43)***   (-14.97)*** (-15.20)***    (-5.22)*** (-5.37)***    (-7.91)*** (-7.71)*** 
Mark. fund.     0.0027     0.0148      0.0024      0.0029 
  
  (0.80)    (2.85)***     (1.15)     (0.77) 
Bank dep.    -0.01     0.0110     -0.00      0.0086 
  
  (-4.32)***    (2.73)***     (-1.07)     (2.97)*** 
Liab. cost      0.0257     0.1206      0.0024      0.0485 
  
  (0.94)    (2.88)***     (0.14)     (1.60) 
Intercept  1.9393  6.6673  7.0455  6.9829  6.6387  8.8857  16.3176  16.3490  0.4434  0.4221  1.9301  2.3191  2.3676  2.5058  2.4341  4.3803  7.7732  7.5864 
 (5.70)*** (6.44)*** (6.67)*** (6.54)*** (12.79)*** (4.25)*** (8.10)*** (8.11)*** (2.19)** (2.09)** (2.82)*** (3.40)*** (3.42)*** (6.70)*** (6.53)*** (2.92)*** (5.30)*** (5.17)*** 
N° of obs.  2733 2733 2733 2733 2741 2741 2741 2741 2733 2733 2733 2733 2733 2741 2741 2741 2741 2741 
R²  0.6777 0.7471 0.7482 0.7502 0.4590 0.4900 0.5457 0.5495 0.0581 0.0632 0.1071 0.1501 0.1509 0.1234 0.1312 0.1456 0.2237 0.2296 
% inc R²/ 
% inc SOA  9.29% 0.15% 0.27%  6.33% 10.21% 0.69%  50.85% 20.56% -5.92% 0.77%  27.96% 8.62% 6.60% 0.92% 
All variables are described in Appendix C. *, **, *** mean significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively and t-statistics are between parentheses. The results of the first two columns (I) and (II) were obtained by 
estimating: ( )5 6, , , , ,
1 1
 1  i t i o c i t d i t t c i t
c d
Cap Cap T BS cα β γ δ ν ε
= =
′′= + + + + + +∑ ∑  where ,0icap , T, and BS stand for initial capital, traditional and bank specific. Column (1) of any of the two dependent variables: Leverage capital ratio (I) and the 
Total risk-based capital ratio (II) presents the results with only one regressor called the initial capital ratio. Column (2) gives the results with five more variables called traditional variables. The subsequent columns (3) and (4) correspond to 
the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables.Results in the columns (III) and (IV) were obtained by estimating: 
( ) ( ), , , 1 ,  3''i t i t i t i tCap Cap Capλ ω∗ −∆ = − +  where ,i tCap ∗ is given by expression (1′′ ) and SOAλ = . Column (1) of any of the two dependent variables: leverage capital ratio (III) and the total risk-based capital ratio (IV) gives the 
speed of adjustment (SOA) when the target specification 
,i t
Cap
∗
 is solely made of the intercept term. Columns (2) and (3) present the results when the initial capital and the traditional variables are respectively added. The subsequent 
columns (4) and (5) correspond to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. 
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Table 6: Alternative econometric method: Panel Least Square with time fixed effects 
Variables Leverage ratio (I) Total risk-based capital ratio (II) ∆  Leverage ratio (III) ∆ Total risk-based capital ratio (IV) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SOA  0.0606 0.0927 0.1321 0.1244 0.1274 0.1745 0.2266 0.2423 0.2564 0.2596 
         (9.28)*** (7.73)*** (9.83)*** (9.49)*** (9.64)*** (17.96)*** (15.89)*** (16.78)*** (17.91)*** (18.10)*** 
In. cap. rat.  0.7343  0.5139  0.5186  0.5227  0.5350  0.4709  0.4285  0.4271   0.0351  0.0229  0.0275  0.0299   0.0593  0.0443  0.0515  0.0531 
 (69.55)*** (39.59)*** (39.88)*** (40.33)*** (45.83)*** (36.39)*** (32.82)*** (32.89)***  (3.18)*** (2.06)** (2.53)** (2.73)***  (4.96)*** (3.62)*** (4.38)*** (4.53)*** 
Size  -0.3490 -0.3403 -0.3223  -0.2046 -0.2994 -0.3670   -0.1066 -0.0974 -0.0986   -0.0642 -0.0819 -0.1037 
  (-13.81)*** (-13.32)*** (-11.97)***  (-5.78)*** (-8.46)*** (-9.52)***   (-6.54)*** (-6.04)*** (-5.80)***   (-2.56)** (-3.20)*** (-3.72)*** 
Profit   0.9334  0.9753  0.9572   0.4188  0.5333  0.5919    0.0789  0.1026  0.1038    0.1702  0.2582  0.2826 
  (17.10)*** (17.58)*** (17.30)***  (5.18)*** (6.80)*** (7.52)***   (2.15)** (2.80)*** (2.83)***   (2.97)*** (4.62)*** (5.03)*** 
Equity cost  -0.0693 -0.0617 -0.0600  -0.0435 -0.0335 -0.0326   -0.0009  0.0070  0.0073   -0.0253 -0.0132 -0.0140 
  (-9.70)*** (-8.46)*** (-8.26)***  (-4.03)*** (-3.16)*** (-3.08)***   (-0.19) (1.52) (1.59)   (-3.32)*** (-1.76)* (-1.86)* 
Econ. cycle   0.0615  0.0624  0.0546   0.1489  0.1602  0.1915    0.0231  0.0319  0.0340    0.0347  0.0582  0.0628 
  (1.85)* (1.87)* (1.60)  (2.79)*** (3.15)*** (3.70)***   (1.11) (1.56) (1.61)   (0.92) (1.61) (1.70)* 
Competition   0.1523  0.1480  0.1191   0.1696  0.1804  0.1991    0.0468  0.0443  0.0418    0.0602  0.0537  0.0611 
  (6.04)*** (5.86)*** (4.57)***  (4.54)*** (5.07)*** (5.57)***   (2.94)*** (2.84)*** (2.59)***   (2.28)** (2.12)** (2.39)** 
Risk    0.2419  0.2716    0.1420  0.1628     0.1391  0.1469     0.2420  0.2344 
  
 (2.76)*** (3.11)***   (1.06) (1.22)    (2.58)*** (2.71)***    (2.56)** (2.48)** 
Cred. dem.   -0.0090 -0.0085   -0.0253 -0.0258    -0.0141 -0.0140    -0.0307 -0.0311 
  
 (-4.45)*** (-4.24)***   (-8.42)*** (-8.62)***    (-11.3)*** (-11.2)***    (-14.40)*** (-14.62)*** 
Cred. act.   -0.0082 -0.0090   -0.0544 -0.0581    -0.0068 -0.0072    -0.0190 -0.0192 
  
 (-3.38)*** (-3.58)***   (-14.51)*** (-14.86)***    (-4.54)*** (-4.63)***    (-6.92)*** (-6.69)*** 
Mark. fund.    -0.0014     0.0135      0.0009      0.0020 
  
  (-0.48)    (3.14)***     (0.53)     (0.67) 
Bank dep.    -0.0143     0.0120     -0.0024      0.0093 
  
  (-6.06)***    (3.42)***     (-1.64)     (3.76)*** 
Liab. cost     -0.0010     0.0836      0.0011      0.0307 
  
  (-0.04)    (2.77)***     (0.08)     (1.43) 
Intercept  2.0743  7.0850  7.3640  7.6999  5.8022  6.7446  11.8371  11.7848  0.4800  0.4562  1.9941  2.2247  2.3072  2.2224  2.0964  2.4296  4.0967  3.9606 
 (21.60)*** (13.21)*** (13.19)*** (13.65)*** (33.02)*** (8.21)*** (13.69)*** (13.60)*** (8.25)*** (7.79)*** (5.77)*** (6.32)*** (6.43)*** (16.09)*** (14.99)*** (4.15)*** (6.50)*** (6.25)*** 
N° of obs.  2733 2733 2733 2733 2741 2741 2741 2741 2733 2733 2733 2733 2733 2741 2741 2741 2741 2741 
R²  0.6454 0.7171 0.7208 0.7249 0.4435 0.4687 0.5204 0.5264 0.0430 0.0466 0.0701 0.1198 0.1210 0.1161 0.1241 0.1361 0.2125 0.2185 
% inc. R²/ 
% inc. SOA  10.00% 0.51% 0.57%  5.38% 9.93% 1.14%  52.97% 42.50% -5.83% 2.41%  29.86% 6.93% 5.82% 1.25% 
All variables are described in Appendix C. *, **, *** mean significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively and t-statistics are between parentheses. The results of the first two columns (I) and (II) were obtained 
by estimating: 
( )5 6, , 1 , 2 , , 1 1 , , 1 ,
3 2
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i t i o i t i t c i t i t d i t t i t
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Cap Cap size economic cycle T credit demand BSα β γ γ γ δ δ ν ε
− −
= =
   
′′′= + + + + + + + +   
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∑ ∑  where ,0icap , T, and BS stand for initial capital, traditional and bank specific. Column 
(1) of any of the two dependent variables: Leverage capital ratio (I) and the Total risk-based capital ratio (II) presents the results with only one regressor called the initial capital ratio. Column (2) gives the 
results with five more variables called traditional variables. The subsequent columns (3) and (4) correspond to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset 
structure variables followed by market discipline variables. Results in the columns (III) and (IV) were obtained by estimating: ( ) ( ), , , 1 ,  3i t i t i t i tCap Cap Capλ ω∗ − ′′′∆ = − +  where ,i tCap ∗ is given by expression (1′′′ ) 
and SOAλ = . Column (1) of any of the two dependent variables: Leverage capital ratio (III) and the Total risk-based capital ratio (IV) gives the speed of adjustment (SOA) when the target specification 
,i t
Cap
∗
 is solely made of the intercept term. Columns (2) and (3) present the results when the initial capital and the traditional variables are respectively added. The subsequent columns (4) and (5) correspond 
to the inclusion of the bank specific variables added in two different waves starting by asset structure variables followed by market discipline variables. 
 
